
Opinions, soapboxes, legal hot takes, and more. Taproom Talk is where we raise a glass and a few eyebrows about everything wrong (and sometimes right) in consumer law.

12/23/25- When Interpretive Rules Become Litigation Weapons. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s most recent shift on Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) preemption has re-ignited a long-running and deeply consequential debate: how much room, if any, remains for state consumer protection laws in the credit reporting arena. After issuing an expansive interpretive rule in October emphasizing narrow preemption, withdrawing that guidance in May, and now advan/cing a new interpretation emphasizing broad federal preemption, the CFPB has left courts and litigants navigating a fractured and unstable doctrinal landscape.
This regulatory whiplash arrives at a critical moment. Courts are divided, pleading strategies are in flux, and motions to dismiss increasingly turn on whether state-law “add-ons” survive FCRA preemption. The CFPB’s latest position will be cited aggressively—particularly by defendants—but its ultimate influence remains uncertain.

FCRA preemption has always been complex by statute. Section 1681t(b)(1) expressly preempts certain state laws relating to the responsibilities of furnishers, consumer reporting agencies, and users of consumer reports. At the same time, other provisions—most notably § 1681h(e)—appear to preserve limited state-law claims involving malice or willful misconduct.
Courts have long struggled to reconcile these provisions, resulting in multiple interpretive frameworks:
Into this already fractured doctrine, the CFPB has repeatedly injected—and withdrawn—its interpretive authority.

In October, the CFPB issued an interpretive rule asserting that FCRA preemption should be read narrowly, allowing state laws to operate unless they imposed requirements squarely within the enumerated preempted categories. The rule emphasized that Congress did not intend to displace broad swaths of state consumer protection law merely because those laws “touch” credit reporting.
That interpretation emboldened plaintiffs to continue pleading state-law claims alongside FCRA causes of action, including:
For a brief period, the CFPB appeared to be signaling regulatory support for a federal floor, not a ceiling, approach to consumer protection.

In May, the CFPB abruptly withdrew its prior interpretation and replaced it with guidance emphasizing that the FCRA broadly preempts state laws that regulate core aspects of credit reporting. Under this new framework, state laws are far more vulnerable to preemption challenges—even when styled as general consumer protection statutes rather than credit-specific regulations.
The shift represents more than a technical adjustment. It reorients the Bureau toward a position that:
For defendants, this guidance arrives as a powerful litigation tool. For plaintiffs, it raises hard questions about which claims remain viable and how to plead them.

A. Pleading Strategy Is Under Pressure
Plaintiffs’ counsel are now forced to reassess whether traditional state-law claims survive dismissal, particularly where those claims rely on duties arguably “covered” by the FCRA. Boilerplate state-law add-ons are increasingly risky.
B. Motions to Dismiss Will Cite CFPB Guidance Heavily
Although interpretive rules lack the force of formal regulations, defendants will cite the CFPB’s position as persuasive authority—especially in jurisdictions already inclined toward broad preemption.
C. Judicial Skepticism Remains
Importantly, courts are not bound by the CFPB’s interpretive reversals. Several courts have already expressed skepticism toward agency attempts to resolve statutory ambiguity through guidance rather than rulemaking. The CFPB’s credibility may be weakened by the speed and frequency of its reversals.

Whether intentional or not, the practical effect of the CFPB’s latest interpretation is to contract the role of state law in consumer credit reporting disputes. This is particularly significant in jurisdictions where state consumer protection statutes have historically provided broader remedies than the FCRA itself.
The irony is difficult to ignore: an agency created to protect consumers may now be advancing a framework that limits their remedial options—at least in litigation.

Despite the CFPB’s new stance, not all state-law claims are necessarily preempted. Claims may still survive where they:
But the margin for error has narrowed, and courts will be scrutinizing these distinctions closely.
CONCLUSION
The CFPB’s latest reversal on FCRA preemption adds uncertainty to an already unsettled area of law. While defendants will seize on the new interpretation to challenge state-law claims, courts remain the ultimate arbiters—and many are wary of regulatory whiplash masquerading as statutory clarity.
For practitioners, the message is clear: state-law claims can no longer be treated as routine appendages to FCRA pleadings. They must be carefully justified, precisely pled, and strategically defended. The next phase of FCRA litigation will be shaped not just by statutory text and Supreme Court precedent, but by how courts respond to an agency that cannot seem to decide how much consumer protection is too much.

The CFPB’s most recent reversal on Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) preemption has materially changed the risk calculus for plaintiff-side consumer litigators. With the Bureau now emphasizing broad federal preemption of state laws touching credit reporting, defendants are already citing the new interpretation in motions to dismiss—often as a threshold argument aimed at eliminating state-law claims at the outset.
For plaintiffs’ attorneys, the question is no longer whether to plead state-law claims alongside FCRA counts, but how to do so in a way that survives preemption challenges in a post-whiplash environment.
I. Stop Treating State Claims as Boilerplate Add-Ons
The era of reflexively appending state consumer protection claims to every FCRA complaint is over—at least for now. Courts will scrutinize whether a state-law claim imposes duties “with respect to” subject matter already regulated by the FCRA.
Practice Tip: Before pleading a state claim, identify the precise duty it enforces and ask:
If the answer is no, expect a preemption challenge.
II. Anchor State Claims to Independent Conduct
State-law claims are most defensible when they target conduct collateral to credit reporting, not the reporting itself.
More likely to survive:
More vulnerable:
Practice Tip: Draft factual allegations so the state claim stands on its own, even if the FCRA count is dismissed.
III. Plead Malice and Willfulness Where Available
Section 1681h(e) remains a critical—though narrow—exception to preemption for certain state-law claims involving malice or willful intent.
Practice Tip: Where supported by facts:
Courts are far more receptive when allegations demonstrate intentional misconduct rather than procedural error.

IV. Separate Duties, Separate Counts
One of the most common plaintiff-side mistakes is commingling state-law and FCRA duties in the same factual narrative. This invites preemption dismissal.
Practice Tip:
The clearer the separation, the harder it is for defendants to argue overlap-based preemption.
V. Anticipate the Motion to Dismiss—and Plead Around It
Defendants will cite the CFPB’s latest interpretation as persuasive authority. Plaintiffs should assume preemption arguments are coming and preempt them in the complaint.
Practice Tip: Include allegations explaining:
Judges are more receptive when plaintiffs show they understand the preemption framework rather than ignoring it.
VI. Preserve State Claims Strategically
In jurisdictions hostile to state-law add-ons, plaintiffs may consider:
Practice Tip: Remember that even where federal courts dismiss state-law claims, state courts may still enforce related contractual or statutory rights.
VII. Watch the Courts, Not Just the CFPB
The CFPB’s interpretive guidance is not binding, and courts remain divided. Some judges have already expressed skepticism toward agency reversals that lack notice-and-comment rulemaking.
Practice Tip: Track:
The judicial response—not the agency’s position—will ultimately determine survivability.
Conclusion: Precision Over Volume
The CFPB’s FCRA preemption whiplash does not eliminate state-law claims—but it does demand discipline, precision, and intentional pleading.
Plaintiffs’ attorneys who adapt their strategies now—by grounding state claims in independent conduct and clearly separating them from FCRA duties—will be best positioned to survive early dismissal and maintain leverage.
11/19/25-The Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) is one of the strongest federal laws protecting consumers from discrimination in lending. It applies to everything from credit cards and car loans to mortgages and personal loans. In November 2025, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) issued a major Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) that would significantly reshape how ECOA is enforced.
These proposed changes would narrow lenders’ liability, restrict certain credit-assistance programs, and shift how discrimination cases are proven. For consumer attorneys, lenders, and borrowers alike, this is one of the most consequential revisions to Regulation B in decades.
Below is a detailed explanation of the proposed changes, what they mean legally, and — critically — how they will impact everyday consumers.

The Equal Credit Opportunity Act (15 U.S.C. § 1691 et seq.) prohibits creditors from discriminating on the basis of:
Regulation B, issued by the CFPB, implements ECOA. The CFPB’s November 13, 2025 proposed rule would amend Regulation B in multiple significant ways — most notably by removing disparate-impact liability, limiting the "discouragement" provision, and restricting certain special credit programs.

1. Ending Disparate-Impact Liability Under ECOA
Under existing interpretations, a lender can violate ECOA if a neutral policy disproportionately harms a protected class — even without discriminatory intent. This is called disparate impact. The CFPB proposes eliminating this standard. Under the new approach, only intentional discrimination (disparate treatment) would be actionable. Neutral policies that statistically harm certain groups would no longer violate ECOA unless intent is proven. This is a profound shift. It would significantly narrow the types of discrimination claims consumers can bring under Regulation B.
2. Narrowing the “Discouragement” Rule
Regulation B currently prohibits creditors from making any statement that would discourage someone from applying for credit based on a protected characteristic. The CFPB wants to narrow this definition. The proposal would:
This would reduce lenders’ exposure and make discouragement claims more difficult to prove.
3. Restricting Special Purpose Credit Programs (SPCPs)
Special Purpose Credit Programs allow creditors to offer targeted assistance to disadvantaged groups who might otherwise struggle to receive reasonable credit terms. The proposed rule would restrict how for-profit lenders can structure these programs. Notably:
This could significantly limit programs designed to remedy historical inequality in access to credit — at least those offered by for-profit institutions.
ECOA protects you from discrimination when applying for credit. It ensures that lenders cannot deny you, charge you more, or steer you away based on your race, gender, national origin, age, marital status, or other protected factors. The proposed rules do not eliminate ECOA — but they do change how easy (or difficult) it will be to hold lenders accountable.
1. It Would Be Harder to Challenge Unfair Lending If the Discrimination Is Subtle Today, a lender can get in trouble if its policies unintentionally harm a protected group more than others.
For example: If a bank uses a credit-scoring rule that results in far fewer approvals for minority applicants, that can be a violation — even if the bank says it didn’t intend to discriminate. Under the proposed changes:
This means some unfair lending practices may continue so long as lenders avoid overt discriminatory intent.
2. Fewer Assistance Programs May Be Available
Special programs designed to help underserved borrowers — such as certain first-time homebuyer programs, credit-building loans, or targeted auto-financing assistance — may be reduced. Why? Because the proposal restricts how for-profit lenders can design programs that benefit groups who have historically faced discrimination. Consumers may see:
Without disparate-impact liability, lenders may rely more heavily on algorithms, data models, or credit-scoring techniques that disproportionately affect certain races, ages, or socioeconomic groups — even if unintentionally.
These effects might include:
If the lender did not intend to discriminate, consumers may have fewer legal tools to challenge these outcomes.
Our team at The Consumer Bar is made up of experienced professionals who are passionate about what they do. From our sales staff to our customer service representatives, we are committed to providing the highest level of service to our clients. ECOA still requires creditors to:
But your ability to pursue a claim for systemic inequality may be reduced. Strong state laws (like those in California, New Jersey, and others) may continue to protect consumers even where federal rules weaken.
If finalized, these changes would shift more responsibility to consumers to:
Consumers who historically benefitted from special credit programs or from disparate-impact protections may feel the effects the most.




The CFPB’s proposed amendments to Regulation B would significantly reshape fair-lending enforcement in the United States. By eliminating disparate-impact liability, narrowing the discouragement rule, and restricting certain special-purpose credit programs, the changes would alter both how lenders operate and how consumers experience the credit market.
For consumers, these changes likely mean fewer protections against subtle discrimination and fewer targeted credit programs designed to increase access. For attorneys and lenders, they signal a major shift in compliance obligations and litigation strategy.
Staying informed — and preparing now — will be essential for protecting consumers and ensuring fair, equitable access to credit in the years ahead.

11/11/25 - The Philippines is one of the most disaster-prone countries in the world. Every year, dozens of typhoons and floods tear through communities, displacing families, destroying homes, and leaving lasting scars. Each storm is a reminder that while nature can be powerful, human kindness is stronger.
For us, this isn’t just an international headline — it’s personal. Through our dear friend and colleague Aura, we’ve seen firsthand how devastating these events can be. Cebu was recently struck hard by severe storms and flooding, leaving families without homes, food, or clean water. Aura’s family, along with so many others, is now facing the daunting task of rebuilding from the ground up. When she shared what was happening — homes washed away, electricity lost, the loss of family members, friends, neighbors, and family pets, the lack of fresh drinking water and much more — we knew we had to act.
At Ginsburg Law Group, our mission has always been about standing up for people when life knocks them down. Whether that’s in a courtroom or across the world, the principle is the same: we help because we can.

Cebu is not alone in its suffering. Across the Philippines, repeated disasters compound over time — floods follow typhoons, landslides hit areas that never fully recovered from the last storm, and rebuilding often takes years.
Entire communities are relying on aid for food, shelter, and medical supplies. Local volunteers are doing heroic work, but their resources are stretched thin.
And yet, amidst this devastation, the spirit of the Filipino people continues to shine — in the way neighbors share food, rebuild together, and look out for one another. It’s this spirit that inspired us to get involved.

Here are the main types of assistance that really move the needle

Here are actionable steps you can take — whether you’re based in the U.S., online, or planning travel to the Philippines

Since we represent consumers and frequently write about legal and financial rights, we want to highlight a connection: disasters in the Philippines don’t just destroy physical infrastructure—they also create financial vulnerability. Families may lose homes, jobs, savings; they may become victims of predatory lending in the aftermath. Helping rebuild their stability means helping protect their rights. If you—our readers, clients, or community members—have connections to the Philippines (family, business, etc.), we encourage you to:

What are we doing? We are raising awareness and raising funds for our colleague, Aura and her family. Aura’s courage has inspired us all. She reminds us that behind every statistic is a story — of mothers, fathers, children, and communities determined to rise again. We’re proud to stand beside her, to support Cebu, and to use our voice and platform to help amplify theirs. The road to recovery is long, but hope grows stronger when compassion leads the way. If you’d like to contribute or learn more about our ongoing campaign, please visit: https://gofund.me/5353d73a5. Together, let’s show that kindness knows no distance — and that even across oceans, community endures. 💙
While immediate aid is critical, long-term resilience is equally important. By supporting the Philippines now, we help communities prepare for future disasters — building stronger homes, better early-warning systems, and more sustainable infrastructure. Please join us in helping the Philippines.

10/28/25-Unwanted calls and texts have become part of modern life—but in 2025, the tide may finally be turning. In the past few weeks, several major lawsuits have been filed across the country under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), a federal law designed to protect consumers from intrusive telemarketing, robocalls, and mass texting campaigns. What’s remarkable about this new batch of cases is how broad they are. The defendants range from a national telecom carrier to a home-improvement manufacturer to one of the country’s largest banks. Together, they paint a picture of widespread disregard for consumer consent—and of a statute that remains one of the strongest tools for restoring a measure of peace and privacy to everyday life.

Below, we look at three standout cases:
and what each reveals about the direction of consumer protection in 2025.

The plaintiffs in Keidan allege that AT&T violated not only the federal TCPA but also the Florida Telephone Solicitation Act (FTSA)—a powerful state-level privacy law that mirrors and expands upon the federal statute. Florida’s FTSA, amended in 2021, has quickly become one of the toughest consumer privacy laws in the country. It allows lawsuits over unwanted text messages and makes it illegal to use an automated system to call or text consumers without express consent. Each violation can cost a business up to $1,500 per call or text in statutory damages. The significance of Keidan lies in the way state and federal laws now operate side-by-side, creating overlapping layers of liability. A single unsolicited text in Florida could, in theory, violate both the TCPA and the FTSA—doubling potential exposure. For consumers, that’s a good thing: it strengthens enforcement in a landscape where federal regulators, like the FCC, can’t pursue every bad actor. For businesses, however, it’s a compliance nightmare The case also lands amid broader national trends: states like Washington, Oklahoma, and Maryland are considering or have enacted similar “mini-TCPA” statutes. Together, these laws signal a growing recognition that privacy enforcement is increasingly a shared federal-state responsibility.

In Lui, a California consumer claims Capital One repeatedly called using an auto-dialer and prerecorded messages about a debt. The lawsuit pairs the TCPA with the Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (RFDCPA)—California’s version of the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA).
That combination is powerful. Debt collection calls often test the limits of consumer tolerance; when automated systems enter the picture, they can become overwhelming. The Lui complaint frames these calls not just as a financial nuisance but as an invasion of personal privacy, blending the “harassment” theory from debt-collection law with the “consent” theory from the TCPA. This convergence of debt defense and robocall litigation is becoming more common, and for good reason. Many collectors use automated dialing systems without realizing they’re subject to the same TCPA restrictions that apply to telemarketers. The Lui case makes clear that even legitimate debts don’t create carte blanche for relentless auto-calls. For consumers struggling with debt, this matters: the same unwanted contact that might feel like collection harassment could also be a TCPA violation worth hundreds or thousands in statutory damages per call.

In Pennsylvania, homeowner Newell filed a proposed nationwide class action against Pella Windows & Doors, alleging the company made telemarketing calls promoting home-improvement services without consent.
At first glance, it might look like another standard telemarketing suit—but the broader context makes it more important. The TCPA’s class-action mechanism remains one of the few ways individual consumers can hold large corporations accountable for small, repeated harms. If a company makes a few thousand unwanted calls, few people will sue individually. But together, those consumers can form a nationwide class and bring powerful claims under a federal statute that Congress intended to be privately enforced.
This case also reminds us that telemarketing remains alive and well in industries that may seem old-fashioned. As companies shift from door-to-door sales to data-driven lead generation and auto-dialed outreach, many cross the legal line without realizing it. For homeowners, this means that the same call offering to “inspect your windows” or “update your kitchen” could carry TCPA implications if made without clear, documented consent.

The timing of these filings isn’t accidental. Two major developments have recently shaken the TCPA landscape:
Together, these changes have created both opportunity and chaos. For plaintiffs, the looser interpretive landscape can open doors for broader claims. For defendants, it means compliance strategies based solely on FCC guidance may no longer be sufficient.

The heart of the TCPA is consent. Businesses must get your permission before calling or texting you with automated systems, and you have the right to withdraw that consent at any time. If you receive repeated calls or texts after opting out—or if you never consented in the first place—you may have grounds to take action. Each unauthorized call or text can result in $500 to $1,500 in statutory damages, depending on whether the violation was willful. In practice, that means consumers have real leverage. Class actions like Newell show how one person’s experience can drive systemic change, while cases like Lui demonstrate that even in debt situations, dignity and privacy still matter. If a company continues to contact you despite your requests to stop, keep records:
These docs can make all the difference if you decide to assert your rights.

The TCPA is no longer just about telemarketing—it’s about control. As technology evolves, so do the methods companies use to reach us: predictive dialers, AI chatbots, and SMS marketing platforms now blur the line between communication and intrusion. For consumers, the message of these recent cases is empowering: you have the right to control who contacts you and how. For attorneys, they’re a call to action: the TCPA and its state counterparts remain some of the most effective statutes for protecting privacy, deterring corporate overreach, and securing meaningful statutory relief for clients.

2025 may well be remembered as the year of the robocall reckoning. With cases like Keidan, Lui, and Newell leading the charge, courts across the country are reaffirming that privacy is not a luxury—it’s a right.
If you’re tired of hearing from companies you never invited to your phone, you’re not alone—and the law is on your side.

10/15/25 - In Perrong v. Bradford (3d Cir. Oct. 6, 2025), the Third Circuit confronted a deceptively simple question with profound constitutional implications: can state legislators be sued under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA)?
The court’s answer — no, absent “unmistakably clear” congressional intent — reaffirms a traditional principle of constitutional structure: that sovereign exclusion remains the default rule when Congress legislates in areas touching state functions.
Yet for those of us who advocate daily for consumers navigating an increasingly intrusive digital marketplace, Perrong also illustrates a deeper tension between federalism’s structural values and the functional realities of modern consumer protection.
The plaintiff alleged that state legislators, acting in their official capacity, had violated the TCPA’s prohibitions on unsolicited communications. The Third Circuit declined to extend the statute’s reach that far. Relying on the canon of clear statement — the idea that Congress must express an “unmistakably clear” intent before subjecting states or their officials to federal constraints — the court preserved a doctrinal boundary long respected in our federal system. This reasoning, grounded in Gregory v. Ashcroft (1991) and echoed in the Supreme Court’s post-Loper Bright jurisprudence, reflects a textualist fidelity to separation of powers and the constitutional balance between state and federal authority.
From a doctrinal standpoint, Perrong is entirely defensible. From a consumer standpoint, it is troubling.
The TCPA was enacted to protect one of the most intimate spaces of personal privacy — the right not to be disturbed in one’s own home (or now, one’s own phone). Over the past three decades, it has become one of the few federal statutes that empowers consumers directly, enabling individuals to vindicate their privacy rights through private enforcement.
Yet Perrong reminds us that the judiciary’s renewed emphasis on structural restraint can curtail the statute’s remedial reach. When courts insist upon bright-line exclusions for state actors, even in contexts where those actors engage in commercial or quasi-commercial behavior, the consumer’s ability to hold violators accountable contracts accordingly.
This is not to say that federalism principles are misplaced. But as the boundary between state and private enterprise continues to blur — particularly in technology, healthcare, and political communications — the rigid application of sovereign immunity risks leaving consumers without meaningful recourse.
Perrong is emblematic of a wider intellectual movement in contemporary administrative and statutory interpretation — one characterized by skepticism toward implied delegations and a preference for structural clarity. The dismantling of Chevron deference in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo (2024) signaled the judiciary’s desire to reassert control over statutory meaning.
In that environment, doctrines like sovereign exclusion are gaining renewed strength. Courts are increasingly unwilling to infer congressional intent to displace state autonomy or to expand private enforcement beyond the most explicit textual commands.
For consumer advocates, this means that our work is no longer confined to litigation — it must extend to legislation. If Congress intends for federal consumer protection laws to reach state or quasi-state actors, it must say so with precision. Statutory clarity has become not merely good drafting; it is now a constitutional necessity.
Perrong should not be read as an anti-consumer decision, but as a reflection of the judiciary’s commitment to federal structure. The challenge for Congress — and for those of us who work in this field — is to reconcile that structure with the equally vital imperative of consumer protection.
Federalism should not become a shield for conduct that, in substance, mirrors the private market behavior Congress sought to regulate. Nor should the absence of a “magic phrase” in a statute deprive consumers of the remedies that justice and common sense demand.
As the law evolves, our task as advocates is to ensure that constitutional fidelity and consumer fairness remain in dialogue — not in conflict.

09/08/25- Most people know the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) as the federal law that cracks down on robocalls and unwanted texts. But there’s another piece of the statute that’s suddenly driving lawsuits: the clock.
Under TCPA rules, businesses may not send telemarketing calls or texts before 8:00 a.m. or after 9:00 p.m. in the recipient’s local time. For years, litigation focused almost entirely on consent — whether companies had permission to contact consumers. Now, a new wave of lawsuits is highlighting violations of “Quiet Hours.”

In the past week alone, several class actions were filed alleging that businesses sent texts or calls too early in the morning or too late at night, including:
The common thread? All argue that companies ignored TCPA’s time-of-day restrictions.

The TCPA was enacted in 1991, when intrusive dinnertime robocalls were the main complaint. Congress specifically wrote in time-of-day restrictions to protect consumer privacy during rest hours. Violating these rules can be costly:
If a company sends thousands of messages during restricted hours, damages can balloon into the millions.

So why the sudden focus on Quiet Hours in 2025?
Several reasons:

For companies, these lawsuits are a wake-up call. It’s not enough to simply get consent or offer an opt-out. Timing must be programmed correctly.
Mistakes happen when:
Even if consumers consented, a single 6 a.m. coupon text could trigger a lawsuit.

For consumers, this litigation trend is encouraging. It shows courts are enforcing the TCPA in ways that reflect modern life. Everyone knows how disruptive a 2 a.m. buzz on your phone can be. If you’re receiving promotional calls or texts outside legal hours, you may have a claim. Keeping screenshots of timestamps and call logs can help preserve evidence.

Quiet Hours cases are likely to grow in 2025 and beyond. Courts may soon address questions like:
Until then, businesses face rising exposure, and consumers gain another shield against unwanted intrusions.

Until then, businesses face rising exposure, and consumers gain another shield against unwanted intrusions.

When J.B. Hunt Transport Services recently agreed to pay $5 million to settle claims it violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), the headlines focused on the size of the settlement. But the deeper story—one that affects millions of job seekers each year—got far less attention.
At issue was J.B. Hunt’s alleged failure to provide job applicants and employees with a copy of their background check and a summary of their rights before taking adverse employment action. That is, the company may have rejected or fired people based on reports they never had a chance to review, let alone dispute.
For those who think this is just a technical misstep or an isolated case, think again. This is not a one-off. This is a flashing red light warning us about how quietly and pervasively due process is being stripped from the hiring process—often through automated systems, third-party screeners, and legally questionable shortcuts.
The FCRA was designed to protect consumers by requiring transparency and fairness when employers use background reports. The law mandates that before someone is denied a job because of such a report, they must receive:
Why? Because background checks are notoriously error-prone. Reports may contain outdated, sealed, or inaccurate information. And when that happens, the consequences are swift and often permanent. The job offer disappears. The interview process ends. And the individual may never know why.
When employers like J.B. Hunt skip these steps, they’re not just breaking the law. They’re denying people the chance to correct mistakes that could derail their livelihoods.
Background checks, particularly criminal history screenings, disproportionately harm communities of color, who have long been overrepresented in the criminal justice system. Even minor offenses from years ago—some of them later expunged—can appear on reports and silently block access to employment.
Add to that the rise of automated hiring systems that reject applicants based on checkboxes, keywords, or background flags with no human review, and you have a digital gatekeeping system that locks people out of jobs without explanation, appeal, or context.
The result? A two-tiered employment system. One for the "clean" candidate—and another for those with even minor blemishes, regardless of their relevance or recency.
Employers often outsource the dirty work to background check vendors, assuming legal liability ends there. It doesn’t. Under the FCRA, the hiring company is still responsible. And frankly, they should be. No one should be denied a job based on information they never saw and never had the chance to correct.
It’s time for companies to rethink how they use background checks—not just because of legal exposure, but because of what fairness demands. That means:
The J.B. Hunt settlement should be a wake-up call, not just for corporate legal departments, but for policymakers, civil rights advocates, and consumers. As long as employment decisions are outsourced to black-box systems and faceless screeners, millions will be denied opportunity without due process.
America believes in second chances. Our hiring systems should reflect that.
At The Consumer Bar, we love a good cocktail pun. But there’s nothing funny about what’s being slipped into most contracts these days: forced arbitration clauses—aka the legal equivalent of watering down your rights and pretending it’s still strong.
Let’s be clear: forced arbitration is one of the biggest threats to consumer protection in modern law. And it's hiding in plain sight.
When you buy a car, sign a credit card agreement, download an app, or even just buy a blender online—you’re often agreeing (without realizing it) to give up your right to sue in court. Instead, you’re forced into private arbitration, where:
Translation? If a company wrongs thousands of people in the same way, each person has to fight them alone, behind closed doors. That’s not justice. That’s damage control for corporations.
Forced arbitration buries bad behavior. It protects abusive practices, silences consumers, and removes the threat of public accountability.
And here's the real kicker:
It’s in nearly every major contract you sign.
Car leases. Credit cards. Student loans. Gym memberships. Cell phone plans. Streaming services.
It’s not a choice. It’s a trap—disguised as terms and conditions you’ll never read.
Companies know that most people:
So forced arbitration becomes a shield against real consequences, letting companies violate consumer protection laws while avoiding public lawsuits.
You don’t even get your “day in court.” You get a day in a rented conference room with someone paid to keep things quiet.
This isn’t just about legal process—it’s about fairness. We need:
Consumers should never have to give up their constitutional right to a jury trial just to own a cell phone or buy a car.
Forced arbitration is the ultimate “we reserve the right to ignore you” clause. And it’s time to cut it from the cocktail of consumer law.
Consumers deserve transparency. They deserve options.
And most of all—they deserve their day in court.
If you've been forced into arbitration, or if your rights have been shaken, not heard—we’re behind the bar and ready to fight back.
Because here at The Consumer Bar, we believe justice should always be served strong, not hidden in the fine print.

A recent Oregon federal decision in Wilson v. Skopos Financial (Reprise Financial) treated unwanted text messages much like unwanted calls under the Do‑Not‑Call (DNC) rules. That’s a consumer‑friendly signal. Expect more lawsuits targeting mass texting, sharper consent rules, and growing pressure on companies to respect opt‑outs—fast.

What changed: Courts are more willing to read the TCPA’s DNC protections to cover SMS and similar text formats, not just voice calls.
Why it matters: If you’re on the National DNC Registry and you get marketing texts you didn’t consent to, your claim is on stronger footing in more courts—especially where judges lean toward consumer privacy protections.
Consumer takeaway: Register your number on the Do‑Not‑Call Registry and keep screenshots of unwanted texts. They may be actionable.

What changed: Courts are showing less patience when companies blame wrong numbers, recycled numbers, or clerical mix‑ups.
Why it matters: Businesses that rely on outdated lists or “intended for someone else” messages are seeing less sympathy at the pleading stage.
Consumer takeaway: If a text is clearly meant for someone else (e.g., “Hi Brian, finish your loan…”), document it and opt out. You may still have rights.

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What changed: Marketing by text is moving toward “consent‑first” models. Courts and regulators increasingly expect clear, recorded, revocable consent tied to a specific phone number and campaign.
Why it matters: Companies must maintain audit‑ready logs of when and how consent was obtained, and how it can be withdrawn.
Consumer takeaway: If you never agreed to receive texts—or you revoked consent—say so plainly (“I revoke consent. Stop texting me.”) and save evidence.customers to your business.

What changed: Some courts read DNC text protections broadly; others are more narrow.
Why it matters: Plaintiffs gravitate to consumer‑friendly courts, and businesses face uneven rules across jurisdictions. This split can push agencies (like the FCC) or higher courts to clarify the law.
Consumer takeaway: If you’re evaluating a claim, know that where you bring it can matter.

What changed: If texts are covered under DNC rules in a jurisdiction, it becomes easier to argue that a batch of similar texts violated the TCPA for many consumers at once.
Why it matters: Class actions can stop large‑scale texting campaigns and secure statutory damages that deter repeat behavior.
Consumer takeaway: If you and others received similar unwanted texts, a class approach may increase leverage.

What changed: Marketers are shifting to RCS and other channels beyond traditional SMS.
Why it matters: If the message functions like a telemarketing text—i.e., it’s an unsolicited sales pitch to your device—expect TCPA‑style arguments to follow, plus state‑law analogs.
Consumer takeaway: The label (“SMS” vs. “RCS”) matters less than the experience: if it feels like an unsolicited sales text, save it.

What changed: Several states have passed or updated telemarketing and texting laws (sometimes stricter than federal rules) with their own definitions, quiet‑hours, and consent standards.
Why it matters: Even if a federal TCPA claim is uncertain, state‑law claims may apply—and can carry separate penalties.
Consumer takeaway: Unwanted texts may trigger state claims, too. A local consumer attorney can help you navigate both levels.

What changed: Judges increasingly expect one‑word opt‑outs like “STOP” to be honored promptly, and companies to provide frictionless ways to revoke consent.
Why it matters: Continued messages after a clear opt‑out can raise damages and undermine a company’s defense.
Consumer takeaway: Use simple commands like “STOP".

What changed: Courts look critically at lead generators and data brokers feeding contact lists to brands and lenders.
Why it matters: “We got your number from a vendor” no longer flies if the vendor can’t prove valid, specific consent.
Consumer takeaway: If a sender claims you opted in through a partner, ask for proof. Lack of verifiable consent helps your case.

What changed: Many companies push disputes into arbitration via fine‑print terms. But enforceability can hinge on how you allegedly agreed, and what the clause covers.
Why it matters: Courts are scrutinizing assent (did you really agree?), scope (does it cover these texts?), and unconscionability.
Consumer takeaway: Don’t assume you have no options because of an arbitration clause. Ask a lawyer to evaluate the specific terms.

Signals to Watch in 2025–2026
Quick FAQ
Q: I’m on the Do‑Not‑Call Registry. Can a company text me anyway?
A: They need valid, specific consent (and they must honor your opt‑out). Absent that, many courts treat promotional texts to DNC numbers as violations.
Q: What if the text was meant for someone else?
A: That often doesn’t excuse the sender. Misdirected or recycled‑number messages can still violate the law if you didn’t consent.
Q: I typed “STOP,” but the messages kept coming.
A: Save the thread. Each post‑opt‑out text can increase exposure for the sender and strengthen your claim.
Bottom Line
Wilson v. Reprise continues a broader move toward treating texts as protected communications under the TCPA’s DNC framework. For consumers, that’s good news: stronger privacy, clearer consent rules, and more accountability for companies that text first and ask questions later.